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Technical Aspects of
the Swedish Tax System
Annell Deduction
The first point we discuss is the value of the Annell deduction for new
share issues. In chapter 4 we argued that the deduction must be trans-
formed into a tax saving per dollar of investment. The problem of
transformation arises simply because assets depreciate. In deriving the
cost of capital for a hypothetical investment project, we implicitly
assumed that the financial capital raised to pay for new investment was
repaid to the investors as the asset depreciated. In the light of this, it is not
reasonable to interpret the Annell rules to imply that a firm that raises
one hundred crowns worth of new equity capital to finance an asset that
depreciates in, say five years' time would be able to deduct /i(100)
annually for w years notwithstanding that after five years the original one
hundred crowns are already repaid to the equity investors. Consider an
all-equity firm that distributes all its after-tax economic profits, including
real capital gains. This firm would issue new shares at time u of an
amount, N(u), equal to the change in the nominal value of its capital
stock,
(C.I) N{u) = PKK + PKK,
where PK denotes the price of capital goods and K the net capital stock.
Assuming geometric depreciation at the rate of 8 so that I = K + bK,
we have
(C.2) N(u) = PKI-(b--n)PKK,
where TT = PKIPK- The flow of new equity capital therefore equals the
amount required to finance gross investment minus the amount repaid to
the owners to maintain the chosen equity/capital ratio (of unity) as the
capital stock depreciates and the price level rises.
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In the case of pure debt finance, the equation corresponding to (C.2)
represents the net change in debt. The two terms appearing on the
right-hand side of (C.2) then have a clear interpretation as borrowing to
finance new investment and amortization of previously acquired debt to
maintain the debt/capital ratio. Such a distinction is obviously difficult to
make in the case of new issues, since it is hard to imagine that firms in
practice would simultaneously raise and pay back new equity capital. For
analytical purposes, however, we may look upon the flow of new share
capital to the firm as the net of the amount raised to finance investment
and the amount repaid to the owners. It is clear from (C.2) that, except
for the case 5 = ir, the amount of new share capital raised by the firm
N(u), and on which the firm claims Annell deductions, is not equal to
gross investment. Let H be the present value of tax savings per dollar of
new issue, as defined by equation 4.1 in chapter 4. The equivalent present
value of tax savings per dollar of investment, AA, can then be defined as
(C.3) ]AAPKI • e~
pudu = ]HN(u) • e~
pudu.
o o
Integrating by parts, and assuming K(0) = 0, it can then be shown that
(C4) AA =
\p — IT +
where p/(p - IT + 5) is interpreted as the amount of new issues that "on
average" is required per dollar of gross investment. Hence the "net cost
of investment," as defined in chapter 2, becomes
(C.5) l-A = l-flAd-f2T-f3g-AA.
Equation (C.4) assumes that fiscal depreciation coincides with economic
depreciation. As explained in chapter 4, Swedish tax laws allow firms
accelerated depreciation. The deferral of corporation tax brought about
by accelerated depreciation is often compared to an interest-free loan
from the Treasury. The deferred corporate tax may thus be regarded as a
source of finance to the firm.
Let AE represent the present value of the tax savings from true eco-
nomic depreciation, taken to be replacement cost depreciation minus the
nominal capital gain that accrues on fixed assets (cf. Bergstrom and
Sodersten 1981 and King 1977, p. 243),
_ T(S-TT)
J\E —
p — TT + 8
The value of actual depreciation allowances may be written as
(C.6) A=AE+f3g + (f1Ad+f2r-AE),
where the last term (in parentheses) may be interpreted as the presented323 Technical Aspects of the Swedish Tax System
value of the tax savings from accelerated depreciation. The equation for
MRR in chapter 2 (setting wc = d2 = 0 to simplify exposition) becomes
(C.7) MRR = 8 - TT + -H-
1 - T
/3g(p ~ TT + 8)
1-T
To interpret (C.7), consider the case when there is no accelerated
depreciation. In this case/2 = 0,/i = 1, and Ad = AE. Gross capital cost
MRR then equals the rate of change in the nominal value of the asset (8
— TT) plus the required before-tax net rate of return. This net rate of
return is the firm's pretax rate of discount [p/(l — T)] less the imputed
gross return on the investment grant.
As can be seen from (C.7), the effect of accelerated depreciation is to
reduce the weight attached to the firm's pretax rate of discount, and this
effect has a clear economic interpretation. Consider a hypothetical situa-
tion where the Treasury, rather than providing accelerated depreciation
allowances, offers to finance a fraction E of the acquisition cost of the
investment by an interest-free loan, to be repaid at the rate of true
economic depreciation 8 — TT. In order for the firm to be indifferent
between this arrangement and accelerated depreciation, E must be
chosen such that the present value of the imputed interest on this loan
equals the reduction in the present value of tax payments obtained by
accelerating depreciation allowances. This condition means that:
(C.8) / PEe-^-^
 +
 p)udu =AAd+f2T - AE.
o
Solving (C.8), we obtain
(C.9) £
This is exactly the term that appears in our expression for capital cost. E
may be regarded as the proportion (in present value terms) of the
investment that on average is financed by deferred taxes, and therefore 1
— E can be seen as the proportion financed by new equity (or debt or
retained earnings).
We may now express the effects of the Annell deduction as
AA =
- TT P — TT + 8324 Appendix C
There is, finally, an empirical problem to take into account when analyz-
ing the effects of the Annell deduction. In practice, few Swedish firms pay
dividends on new share capital of as much as 10 percent, which is the
maximum rate of Annell deduction. Available data suggest an average
dividend yield of 6 percent for firms issuing new shares at the end of the
1970s, implying an Annell deduction of 6 percent after the new issues. It
is reasonable to assume, however, that a successively higher rate of
deduction—relative to the amount raised by the new issue—can be
claimed for later years, since the amount of dividends paid by firms
typically increases over time. Our numerical calculations actually assume
that, starting at 6 percent, the rate of Annell deduction increases over
time at the rate of inflation. A 10 percent rate of inflation means,
therefore, that the maximum Annell deduction (10 percent) can be
claimed on the sixth year after the new issue (assuming the initial deduc-
tion to be 6 percent). The firm then deducts 10 percent annually for an
additional six years, after which time the sum of deductions taken equals
the amount raised by the new issue. In the case of stable prices the annual
deduction of 6 percent is taken for 16.7 years.
The Effects of Abolishing Corporate Income Tax
We examine here the relationship between the corporate tax rate and
the tax wedge between savings and investment. Equation (2.17) of chap-
ter 2 may be written as
(C.ll) p = ^-[i-X]-'n,
1 1 — T
where
When the sum of the investment grant (f3g) and the present value of the
tax savings from depreciation allowances and so on exceed the tax savings
from true economic depreciation (AE) X > 0. If the tax system allows
immediate expensing of investment and no further deductions or grants
(fi
 = 1> /i - f?>
 = AA — 0), equation (C.12) simplifies to X = T. We note
also that the abolition of the corporate income tax implies X = 0.
For debt finance, the firm's after-tax rate of discount p is related to the
nominal market interest rate / by equation (2.24) of chapter 2, which is
Substituting into (C.ll) yields
(C.i4) i=l±!L,
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where the subscript D signifies that the discount rate p takes the value
/(I - T). Equation (C.14) defines (in implicit form, since / appears as an
argument of XD) the maximum nominal interest / the firm can afford to
pay on a loan acquired to finance an investment project with a pretax rate
of return p (say 10 percent).
It is clear from equation (C.14) that if the tax laws provide for acceler-
ated write-off (XD > 0), the abolition of the corporation income tax
(making XD = 0) would reduce /. Through the fall in the nominal interest
rate /, the posttax return to savings is reduced, increasing the wedge
between the pre- and posttax rates of return p and s and therefore the
effective tax rate.
In the case of an equity-financed investment project, equation (C. 13) is
replaced by p = i/Q for new share issues and p = /(I - m)/l - z) for
retained earnings. Since the corporate tax rate T does not appear in these
equations, the effect of abolishing the corporation tax can be inferred
directly from equation (C.ll). Inverting this equation yields
It is immediately clear that only if X > T at the outset will p, and therefore
/, fall as the corporation tax is abolished. Thus only if tax laws allow firms
deductions (or grants) that reduce tax payments by more than would
immediate expensing will the wedge between the pre- and posttax rates of
return p and s (and therefore the effective tax rate) increase upon
abolishing the corporation income tax.